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CURRENT LEGISLATION
LABOR LEGISLATION
Since 1954, Congress has become increasingly concerned with the prob-
lems raised by the rapid and unregulated development of the size, scope and
power of employee welfare and pension plans, and, after hearings in 1954,
1956 and 1957, Congress finally adopted the Welfare and Pension Plan
Disclosure Act. 1 The special Senate committee reporting the bill in 1958
stated that there was a three-fold problem. First, insurance abuses had to be
curbed; 2
 second, administration abuses and mismanagement had to be
ended; and third, a general disclosure of plan financial activity had to be
made in order to protect the rights of the beneficiaries of the plans . 3 The
1958 Senate version of the bill, supported by President Eisenhower, 4 at-
tempted to solve this problem by requiring disclosure of the financial activity
of such plans, coupling this with criminal sanctions for failure to comply
with the provisions of the bill. Preferring to rely on legal action taken by
individual employees, and feeling that mere disclosure would end dishonest
plan administration, the House of Representatives was less willing than the
Senate to impose criminal liability for welfare and pension plan abuse. 9 The
House version of the bill, containing no criminal sanctions,° was passed by
both houses and signed by the President, who admitted approving the bill
with reservations, anticipating that later amendments would considerably
strengthen the new law?
This expectation was realized on March 12, 1962, when Congress passed
amendments to the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act!' Two years of
experience with the 1958 law indicated that the Department of Labor, where
reports of welfare and pension plan activity were made, had become "a mere
repository" of documents,9 and furthermore, as the then Secretary of Labor
Arthur J. Goldberg stated, these were only summary reports." Moreover,
25,000 of these were delinquent. Goldberg complained that binding, uniform
interpretation of technical wording was needed but unauthorized by the ex-
isting Iaws; 11 that the reliance of the bill on individual employee and bene-
72 Stat. 997, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1958).
2 3 U.S, Code Cong. & Ad. News 4146 (1958). The Senate committee cited such
undesirable practices as payment of exorbitant commissions, charging of fictitious and
excessive administrative fees and switching of carriers to obtain high first year premiums.
3 Id. at 4139-40.
4 Id. at 5408.
5 Id. at 4190.
6
 The House report is not explicit as to the reasons for omitting criminal penalties.
Perhaps it is, as one commentator suggests, that the House of Representatives wanted
time to study the incoming reports before deciding on specific positive action. See 42
L.R,R.M. 86-87 (1958).
7 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 505 (1962).
8 76 Stat. 35 (1962), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-09 (Supp. 1962), amending 72 Stat, 997, 29
U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1958) (hereinafter referred to by section).
9 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 509 (1962).
10
 Id. at 506.
11 Prior to passage of the amendments the Secretary of Labor issued "interim
memoranda" on such items as exemption from filing, L.RX. 8604 (1959) ; Whether a
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ficiary complaint and court action was unrealistic; 12 that the Secretary sorely
needed investigatory and enforcement powers to effectively administer the
act; and finally, that flagrant abuses such as conflicts of interest, kickbacks and
embezzlements were still not punishable under the act."
The amendments are a multi-pronged weapon attempting to employ ad-
ministrative, criminal and financial sanctions to wrongdoing, and seeking to
alleviate some of the confusion with regard to such matters as what informa-
tion must be filed and who must file. Such confusion arose during the first
two years of the act, leaving plan administrators in the dark as to what their
responsibility was under the new law. The fog-clearing process has been
facilitated, first of all, by the inclusion in the amendments of a definitional
section" which clearly applies the act to the District of Columbia and pos-
sessions of the United States generally, spells out the scope of the act as
being concurrent with that of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Railway Labor
Act, and explicitly states who is to be considered a "party in interest" under
section 13 of the act which, under the amendments, requires disclosure of such
a person's interest in a plan.
In addition to definitions, however, Congress has attempted to make
compliance with the law easier by allowing the Secretary of Labor to issue
binding administrative rulings in advance of action contemplated by plan
administrators subject to the act in much the same fashion as followed by the
Internal Revenue Service. 18 These rulings should have the effect of eliminat-
ing needless litigation and of providing plan administrators with a measure
of certainty that they are complying with the law. Moreover, the Secretary
of Labor has been empowered by the amendments to issue regulations regard-
ing the form of the welfare and pension plan reports, and, in his discretion,
to relieve plan administrators of their duty to supply certain information
which he finds to be repetitive, uninformative or not readily ascertainable. 18
This, too, should be a welcome improvement. The committee reporting the
bill for these amendments expressed the legislative intent that this leeway
granted the Secretary would be used to simplify reports, 17 and to this end sec-
tion 9 of the amendments specifically allows a waiver of the full annual re-
port of financial activities though not of the description of the plan required
by section 16. 18
Plan Has Been Established by an Employer, or by an Employee or by Both, L.R.X. 8605
(1959). Despite these high level rulings, no person could rely on them with certainty for
each carried with it the ominous caveat that "This memorandum is . . not an official
ruling ... authoritative interpretation . . . being left to the courts."
12 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 508 (1962). On this point the House Committee
regards the record as clear "that `self-policing' and the institution of suits by participants
and beneficiaries will not result in compliance with even the provisions of the present
law."
13
 Id. at 509.
14 Section 4.
15 Section 16(a) (setting forth new section 12 of the act).
16 Section 7.
17 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 510 (1962).
18 Prior to the amendments all plan administrators falling under the act had to file a
thorough and exhaustive financial report. The relief granted to administrators of small
funds, the assets of which are often handled by outside banks and insurance companies,
should be great because it frees them from the duty to supply certain remotely obtainable
information.
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The importance of the amendments extends well beyond mere clarification
of the original act. As has been pointed out, the most serious weakness of
that act was its lack of force. The reliance which the act placed upon action
by private individuals to enforce their rights based upon information made
available by the required disclosure of information, previously held secret,
had proved to be unrealistic." The amendments recognized the fact that if
protection of the rights of individual employees and beneficiaries was the
major reason for the law, then further governmental action was necessary.
The first new sanction to consider is administrative. Whereas the
Secretary of Labor was previously quite powerless to enforce the act, the
amendments grant him administrative subpoena powers and investigative
authority when compliance with the law is questioned.2° Furthermore, the
Secretary can now require an independent auditor's certification of the re-
port" which should turn out to be an excellent low cost method of avoiding
plan abuse. Because of the highly ethical nature of the accounting profession,
it is reasonable to expect that no independent auditor would certify as a
"true statement of the financial records" of a plan if there were material
misstatements or omissions in those records. The possibility of an outside
audit should be a real deterrent to an unscrupulous administrator who de-
pends on secrecy and a "friendly audit" for protection. Lastly, the Secretary
is now authorized to bring a civil action in a federal court to enjoin violation
of the act,22 greatly strengthening the Government's former authority to go
to court only in the event of "deliberate defiance, or persistent refusal in bad
faith to comply . . . "23 with the act.
The second new sanction is criminal penalty. The amendments add to
Title 18 of the United States Code three new felonies: theft or embezzle-
ment from welfare or pension plans covered by the act ; 24 concealment of
facts which are required to be disclosed under the act, 25 and kickbacks by
or to officials of plans covered by the act." Inasmuch as federal crimes must
be statutory, the federal government was powerless to act against baldfaced
thievery such as had been occurring." While state prosecution was, and still
is, a possibility, local prosecution is extremely difficult where interstate plans
are involved.
Third, Congress has added financial sanctions to the act in the form
of bonding requirements, and has delegated authority to the Secretary of
Labor to make appropriate regulations therefor." Essentially the new law
13 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4140 (1958). The congressional hearings brought
out the fact that there were plan abuses and that information regarding plan management
was scarce. The logical step was, as the Senate committee reporting the bill in 1958 said,
"to bring the facts with respect to their financing and reserves out into the open and . .
permit self-policing and self-appraisal of these plans by the participants. . . ."
2e.Section 15(b) (setting forth new sections 9(d) and (e) of the act).
21
 Section 9 (c)
22 Section 15(b) (setting forth new section 9(f) of the act).
23
 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4190 (1958).
24
 Section 17(a).
25 Section 17(c).
28 Section 17 (e).
27 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 510 (1962).
28 Section 16(a) (setting forth new section 13(a) of the act).
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requires all administrators, officers of companies administering plans and
their employees to be bonded in an amount not less than $1,000 or ten per
cent of the assets of the fund, whichever is more, and not more than $500,000
or ten per cent of the fund, should the Secretary so require." It is further
required that the person being bonded have no interest in the insurance
company issuing the bond, direct or indirect." This last provision has been
interpreted by the Secretary to allow the insurance company to serve a fund
both as a bonding agent and as an insurer in other capacities (e.g., to under-
write liability insurance and employee life insurance). The test established
is one of the bonding company's freedom to exercise an independent judgment
as to the insurability of the personnel in question."
The National Association of Manufacturers" and the United States
Chamber of Commerce' have gone on record against the bonding provisions
and the subsequently issued regulations. Their quite similar arguments are
that bonding will cause an unreasonable expense and an undue burden on the
beneficiaries because of the complexity of the bonding regulations and the
requisite employment of expensive legal advice in interpreting them. Both
organizations also raised the technical objection to there being legal duties
owed to a Pm as expressed in the regulations. As an example, the Chamber
of Commerce cites the regulations whereby "certain persons" (bonding com-
panies) are to secure any loss to the plan." The argument runs that since
many plans are not legal entities, they cannot have legal duties owed to them.
It is still too early to tell whether this distinction will be drawn by the courts
to anyone's disadvantage.
Another objection raised is that where several plans are jointly adminis-
tered, the size of the required bond is determined not by the aggregate sum
of the funds, but as if each fund were administered individually. Thus the
example is given of a single fund of $50 million secured by a $500,000 bond
(the usual maximum under the act) as opposed to four funds of $5 million
being jointly administered, but bonded for $2 million (four multiplied by ten
per cent of each fund). Hence the curious situation arises where a $50 million
fund is secured by an amount equalling but one per cent of its value as op-
posed to a $20 million fund being secured by a bond equalling a - full ten per
cent of the plan's worth. This would seem, on the surface, to be a valid ob-
jection, but it should be noted that the $500,000 ceiling can be raised to ten
per cent of the fund if the Secretary feels that this is necessary to safeguard
these assets 35 Again it is too early to determine whether the discretionary
aspect of increasing the bond beyond $500,000 will result in an injustice.
The bonding provisions could, in addition to insuring the funds, have
29 Ibid.
3° Section 16(a) (setting forth new section 13(c) of the act).
31 51 Lab. Rel. Rep. 237 (Nov. 5, 1962). For the full text of the ruling see L.R.X.
8691 (1959). The Secretary points out that the purpose of limiting the insurer's connec-
tion with the plan was to force all plan administrators to pass under the scrutiny of a
bonding company, and that this purpose would not be thwarted merely because an in-
surance company did more than one type of business with a plan.
32 51 Lab. Rel. Rep. 188 (Oct. 22, 1962).
33
 51 id. 166 (Oct. 15, 1962).
34
 Ibid.
35 Supra note 28.
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the further benefit of eliminating criminal influences from positions of plan
management, for underwriters make it a practice to investigate the back-
ground and character of those for whom they have been invited to issue a
bond. They are loath to insure losses when convicted criminals are closely
involved in financial activities, the honest administration of which is vital to
the underwriter's profit. Already apparent are the difficulties faced by one
major union in obtaining the bond coverage required by the Landrum-
Griffin Act, even when allowed "blanket bonds." 36 Thus the inability of a
questionable individual to obtain a bond, together with other judicial, ad-
ministrative and financial sanctions, should make the Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act the protector of employee benefits that it was originally
intended to be.
The amendments, in addition to clarification and enforcement sections,
include a provision for a council to advise the Secretary of Labor regarding
enforcement and interpretation of the act. 27 Hopefully, the House committee
reporting the bill was correct in its expectation that the council will render
great help to the Secretary and gain the cooperation of interested groups. 38
STEPHEN M. RICHMOND
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
New Jersey has recently amended sections 9-204 and 9-312 of its Com-
mercial Transactions statute' by deleting three subsections, all relating to
security interests in after-acquired property. 2
36 51 Lab. Rel. Rep. 106 (Oct. 1, 1962).
87 Section 16(a) (setting forth new section 14 of the act).
88 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 511 (1962).
1 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 12A: 9-204 & 9-312 (1961).
2 Section 9-204. When Security Interest Attaches; After-Acquired Property; Future
Advances.
(1) A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection (3)
of Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights
in the collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence
have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
(2) For the purposes of this section the debtor has no rights
[(a) in crops until they are planted or otherwise become growing crops,
in the young of livestock until they are conceived;]
(4) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause
[(a) to crops which become such more than one year after the security
agreement is executed except that a security interest in crops which
is given in conjunction with a lease or a land purchase or improve-
ment transaction evidenced by a contract, mortgage or deed of
trust may if so agreed attach to crops to be grown on the land
concerned during the period of such real estate transaction ;]
Section 9-312. Priorities Among Conflicting Security Interests in the Same Collateral.
[(2) A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to enable the
debtor to produce the crops during the production season and given not more
than 3 months before the crops become growing crops by planting or otherwise
takes priority over an earlier perfected security interest to the extent that such
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